



SFP model – WWER- 1000

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Engineering and Software Development Services*



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

General information

- SFP model was developed as part of PSA level 2 study for unit 5 and 6 of KNPP
- 5 accident scenarios taken from PSA level 1:

Scenario	Containment status	Cooling system (TG)	Alternative cooling system (SS, TB30, OTM)	Spray System
1	Isolated	Failed	Failed	Up to tank depletion
2	Isolated	Failed	Failed	Failed
3	Isolated	Failed	Up to tank depletion	Failed
4	Not Isolated	Failed	Failed	Failed
5	Not Isolated	Failed	Up to tank depletion	Failed



Spent Fuel Pool configuration




Real configuration

SFP Rack

Spent Fuel Pool model - general

○ DATA:


- Reactor type – SFP-BWR
- FA number - 563
- Control rods B_4C – difference from reactor (^{10}B included in rack steel)
- Lower head – flat
- All racks are occupied with FA (163 from reactor core)
- Axial power profile - uniform – 9-th day after reactor shutdown
- Water level – 28,8 m (about 2,5 m above racks)



Fuel assembly distribution



Spent Fuel Pool – CV nodalization





Spent Fuel Pool – core

- Radial rings:
 - 1 ring – 163 assemblies (assemblies removed from reactor $Q_w > 1.00E4$ [W])
 - 2 ring – 149 assemblies ($1.00E3 \leq Q_w \leq 3.00E3$ [W])
 - 3 ring – 125 assemblies ($Q_w \leq 1.00E3$ [W])
 - 4 ring – 126 assemblies ($3.00E3 \leq Q_w \leq 1.00E4$ [W])
 - 5 ring – outer volumes (free of assemblies)
- Axial distribution:
 - 1 ÷ 7 (support construction)
 - 8,19 and 20 (1 lower and 2 upper unheated core part)
 - 9 ÷ 18 (heated core part)



Spent Fuel Pool – core

Lower elevation	Height	UPPER_1	UPPER_2	UPPER_3	UPPER_4	UPPER_5		
25.553	0.172	120	220	320	420	BOK_15	Unheated core part	
25.286	0.267	119	219	319	419	BOK_14		
24.933	0.353	118	218	318	418	BOK_13		
24.58	0.353	117	217	317	417	BOK_12		
24.227	0.353	116	216	316	416	BOK_11		
23.874	0.353	115	215	315	415	BOK_10		
23.521	0.353	114	214	314	414	BOK_9		
23.168	0.353	113	213	313	413	BOK_8		
22.815	0.353	112	212	312	412	BOK_7		
22.462	0.353	111	211	311	411	BOK_6		
22.109	0.353	110	210	310	410	BOK_5	Heated core part	
21.756	0.353	109	209	309	409	BOK_4		
21.44	0.316	108	208	308	408	BOK_3		
21.44	0.06	107 Support plate	207 Support plate	307 Support plate	407 Support plate	507 Support plate		BOK_2
21.38	0.04	106 Support columns	206 Support columns	306 Support columns	406 Support columns	506 Support columns		
21.34	0.06	105 Support plate	205 Support plate	305 Support plate	405 Support plate	505 Support plate		BOK_1
21.28	0.145	104 Support columns	204 Support columns	304 Support columns	404 Support columns	504 Support columns		
21.135	0.145	103 Support columns	203 Support columns	303 Support columns	403 Support columns	503 Support columns		CV020
20.99	0.145	102 Support columns	202 Support columns	302 Support columns	402 Support columns	502 Support columns		
20.845	0.145	101 Support columns	201 Support columns	301 Support columns	401 Support columns	501 Support columns		
20.7								




Spent Fuel Pool – cavity model

- Cavity 1 – volume of the smaller pool – volume CV488 connected to cavity 1 simulates ring 1 + bypass part
- Cavity 2 :
 - Represents partially volume of the bigger pool – same volume as for LP is used (CV020)
 - Spreading model of debris
- Dependent failure of the support structures in bigger pool is simulated based on the debris surface(CAV_ASURF)




Spent Fuel Pool – cavity model cont'd

- Cavity 3 – the containment rooms below SFP
- Cavity 4 – volume of the transport corridor - activates in case of transport hatch failure






Spent Fuel Pool – results



Water Level in smaller pool


- Water in smaller pool (ring 1) evaporates first
- Water in bigger pool is ejected after inner wall failure



Water Level in bigger pool




Spent Fuel Pool – results (contd.)



Clad temperatures in smaller pool

- Fuel assemblies in ring 1 (smaller pool) fails by temperature criterion
- Fuel assemblies in ring 2-4 (bigger pool) fails due to support column failure


Clad failure by CF actuation



Clad temperatures in bigger pool – ring 2




Spent Fuel Pool – results (contd.)



- Hydrogen generation is not significantly less than in reactor

Hydrogen generation – COR and CAV


- CO generation is an issue in KNPP due to concrete chemical composition



CO generation - CAV




Spent Fuel Pool – results (contd.)




Debris mass in cavities

- SFP outer walls failure – about 2.3 days (55 hours)
- Very slow radial ablation – debris temperature is low (1540 K)




Concrete ablation - radial



Concrete ablation - axial




Spent Fuel Pool – results (contd.)




Containment pressure

- Containment pressure meet failure criteria at 10.4 days
- Atmosphere temperature < 200 C
- Flammable gas concentrations – 41 hours after IE



Containment temperature



Containment gas composition 15



Spent Fuel Pool – problems and questions

- ?WWER SFP are divided into 3 main pools (4-th one is for fresh fuel)
- ? Simulation of debris interaction with solid structures – after inner wall failure
- ? Non-supporting structures are forbidden for SFP-BWR
- B₄C oxidation problem– run failure (**bug 1088**)
- Cavity overfilled – overcome with time step change. This behaviour of the model stays unresolved



Example of cavity overfilled problem

TRANSFER PROCESS EDIT

NUMBER OF IN TRANSFER PROCESSES = 8

IN TP	NUMBER OF	NUMBER OF	H IN - H
OUT			
	MASSES IN	THERMO IN	(J)
101-A	6	9	-1.53237E+12
101-B	17	1	0.00000E+00
301-A	5	9	0.00000E+00
301-B	17	1	0.00000E+00
401-A	5	9	0.00000E+00
401-B	17	1	0.00000E+00
501-A	5	9	0.00000E+00
501-B	17	1	0.00000E+00

IN TP	MATL	MASS IN - MASS OUT
	NUMBER	(KG)
101-A	1	0.00000E+00
	2	-4.52523E+05
	3	-8.46115E+05
	4	0.00000E+00
	5	0.00000E+00
	6	4.50940E+02

IN TP	MATL	MASS IN - MASS OUT
	NUMBER	(KG)
101-B	1	-2.08897E+00
	2	-1.15161E+00
	3	-7.31975E+02
	4	-6.32131E-01
	5	-1.37216E+00
	6	-1.36156E+03
	7	-1.38686E+03
	8	-5.18548E+03
	9	-2.81536E+03
	10	-7.70171E+04
	11	-1.81261E-01
	12	-6.54818E+00
	13	0.00000E+00
	14	0.00000E+00
	15	0.00000E+00
	16	0.00000E+00
	17	0.00000E+00

The mass out is much more than mass in (MELCOR 4877 release)



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THANK YOU!