# LFW-SG ACCIDENT SEQUENCE IN A PWR 900: CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING RECENT MELCOR 1.8.5 / 1.8.6 CALCULATIONS

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1<sup>st</sup> EUROPEAN MELCOR USERS' GROUP Villigen, Switzerland 15-16 December 2008



#### **REFERENCE PLANT**:

PWR 900 MWe

**ACCIDENT SEQUENCE:** 

LFW - SG (H2)

#### **INITIATOR**:

LOSS OF NORMAL (AND AUXILIARY) SG FEEDWATER





WHY A CODE-TO-CODE COMPARISON IS IMPORTANT

#### DURING OPEN CALCULATIONS, WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE OUR RESULTS WITH AVAILABLE EXPERIMENTAL DATA.

DEALING WITH PLANT CALCULATIONS THERE IS NOT AN EXPLICIT REFERENCE: A PLANT CALCULATION IS PRACTICALLY A BLIND CALCULATION.



# WP4 (SARNET 1 NoE) GAVE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO PERFORM A CODE-TO-CODE COMPARISON USING ASTEC, MAAP AND MELCOR.



# ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION



# DETAILS: ACCIDENT EVOLUTION











of reactor pressure vessel



# COMPUTING DETAILS

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### **COMPUTING DETAILS**



**<u>COMPUTER</u>** (the same for MELCOR and ASTEC)

PC - PENTIUM 4 - CPU 2400 MHz - 1024 MB of RAM - WINDOWS XP Pro

**TRANSIENT LENGHT (CALCULATION TIME)** (the same for MELCOR and ASTEC)

First Phase	e: 17 h (61200 s)	Re	ason: To	chec	k CODE stat	bility and	capability
Now	: 24 h (86400 s)	ha	ngs.	long	calculations	without	computer

#### **CPU TIME**

 First Phase: 15 h (54000 s) for ASTEC V1.1p2

 2 h (7200 s) for MELCOR 1.8.5 p3

 Now
 : 13 h 25m (48300 s) for ASTEC V1.2 rev.1

 2 h 50 m (10200 s) for MELCOR 1.8.6

**CALC RATIO** (calc time / cpu time)

First Phase  $\begin{cases} \xi a stec = 1.133 \\ \xi melcor = 8.500 \end{cases}$  Now  $\begin{cases} \xi a stec = 1.788 \\ \xi melcor = 8.471 \end{cases}$ 



# PLANT MODELLING

# ASTEC



### INPUT DECK PROVIDED BY IRSN

#### **ASTEC MODULES INVOLVED** IN THE CALCULATION: ISODOP **Isotope treatment** de dels de les les des dels de and activity CPA — CPA SYSINT Thermalhydraulics & Safety system serosols behavior CORIUMmanagement in containment CORIUM SOPHAEROS Corium behavior SOPHAEROS in containment Aerosol & FP vapor behavior in RCS CESAR \_\_\_\_\_ CESAR DIVA Thermal, in RCS Core degradation DIVA— ELSA FP release **RUPUICUV** RUPUICUV **MEDICIS**-Corium ejection & entrainment in MEDICIS:WEX containment IODE -Corium/Concrete Interaction យើយ IODE lodine chemistry In containment



# **DIFFERENT INPUT APPROACH**

IN **MELCOR** SOME DATA AND CONDITIONS MUST BE PROVIDED BY MEANS OF CONTROL (CFs) AND TABULAR FUNCTIONS (TFs), ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE UNDER EXAMINATION, IN WHICH THE MODELLING OF SEVERAL PHENOMENA AND COMPLICATED SYSTEMS IS REQUIRED.

IT MEANS THAT, IN GENERAL, **ASTEC AND MELCOR** INPUT DECKS ARE NOT EASILY COMPARABLE.

# **PRIMARY CIRCUIT MODELLING (1)**





# **PRIMARY CIRCUIT MODELLING (2)**



#### **VOLUMES**

CV300 : pressurizer CV311, 321 and 331: cold leg plus pump 1, 2 and 3 CV312, 322 and 332: intermediate leg 1, 2 and 3 CV313, 323 and 333: hot leg 1, 2 and 3 CV314, 324 and 334: ascending part of steam generator 1, 2 and 3 (SG inlet) CV315, 325 and 335: descending part of steam generator 1, 2 and 3 (SG outlet)

### **JUNCTIONS**

FL214, 224 and 234: from upper-plenum of reactor vessel to hot leg 1, 2 and 3 FL300 : from hot leg1 to pressurizer FL301, 302 and 303: from valve 1, 2 and 3 of pressurizer to containment FL311, 321 and 331: from cold leg 1, 2 and 3 to downcomer of reactor vessel FL312, 322 and 332: from u-leg 1, 2 and 3 to pump/cold leg 1, 2 and 3 FL313, 323 and 333: from hot leg 1, 2 and 3 to SG1, 2 and 3 inlet FL314, 324 and 334: from SG1, 2 and 3 inlet to SG1, 2 and 3 outlet FL315, 325 and 335: from SG1, 2 and 3 outlet to u-leg1, 2 and 3

# **PRIMARY CIRCUIT MODELLING (3)**



### **HEAT STRUCTURES**

 HS30001
 : pressurizer

 HS30002
 : expansion line of pressurizer

 HS31100, 32100 AND 33100
 : cold leg plus pump 1, 2 and 3

 HS31200, 32200 AND 33200
 : intermediate leg 1, 2 and 3

 HS31201, 32201 AND 33201
 : pump1, 2 and 3

 HS31300, 32300 AND 33300
 : hot leg 1, 2 and 3

 HS31400, 32400 AND 33400
 : ascending part of SG 1, 2 and 3

 HS31500, 32500 AND 33500
 : descending part of SG 1, 2 and 3

# **SECONDARY CIRCUIT MODELLING (1)**





# **SECONDARY CIRCUIT MODELLING (2)**



#### **JUNCTIONS**

FL401, 404 and 407: from the first group of safety valves to environment
FL402, 405 and 408: from the second group of safety valves to environment
FL403, 406 and 409: from the third group of safety valves to environment
FL411, 421 and 431: from cavity 1, 2 and 3 to downcomer of SG1, 2 and 3
FL412, 422 and 432: from downcomer 1, 2 and 3 to cavity of SG1, 2 and 3
FL413, 423 and 433: from normal feedwater tank to aux volume 1, 2 and 3
FL414, 424 and 434: from aux volume 1, 2 and 3 to downcomer of SG1, 2, 3
FL415, 425 and 435: from cavity 1, 2 and 3 to steam line 1, 2 and 3
FL416, 426 and 436: from steam line 1, 2 and 3 to barrel
FL417: from barrel to steam header

#### **HEAT STRUCTURES**

- HS41100, 42100 and 43100: bottom internal of cavity side of SG 1, 2 and 3
- HS41101, 42101 and 43101: top 1 internal of cavity side of SG 1, 2 and 3
- HS41102, 42102 and 43102: top envelop of SG 1, 2 and 3
- HS41103, 42103 and 43103: top 2 internal of cavity side of SG 1, 2 and 3
- HS41200, 42200 and 43200: bottom envelop of downcomer side of SG 1, 2, 3
- HS41201, 42201 and 43201: envelop of tube bundle of SG 1, 2 and 3

# **VESSEL (1)**





# VESSEL (2)



#### **JUNCTIONS**

FL210: from downcomer to dome
FL211: from downcomer to bottom
FL212: from bottom to core
FL213: from bottom to core bypass
FL214: from core to upper plenum
FL216: from core bypass to upper plenu
FL215: from dome to upper plenum





**VESSEL (3)** HS21001: downcomer, rectangular part HS21002: downcomer, lateral, bottom side HS21003: downcomer, lateral, upper side HS21100: bottom, hemispherical shape HS21101: bottom, cylindrical side 1 HS21102: bottom, cylindrical side 2 HS21103: bottom, cylindrical side 3 HS21201: core, partition plate 1, rectangular, vertical (located at level 1) HS21202: core, partition plate 2, rectangular, vertical (located at level 2) HS21203: core, partition plate 3, rectangular, vertical (located at level 2) HS21301: core bypass, cylindrical shape HS21302: core bypass, partition plate, rectangular, horizontal HS21401: upper plenum, downcomer side, cylindrical shape HS21402: upper plenum, support wall of guide tubes HS21403: upper plenum, horizontal core support plate, rectangular shape HS21404: upper plenum, vertical guide for tubes, rectangular shape HS21405: upper plenum, vertical structure, rectangular shape HS21501: dome, lid, hemispherical side HS21502: dome, lid, cylindrical side HS21503: dome, internal structures, rectangular shape



# RESULTS

## **ASTEC - MELCOR (Timing Comparison)**

EVENT	ASTEC v1.1 patch 2	MELCOR 1.8.5 patch3
Loss of SG Feedwater (initiator)	0 s	0 s
Scram	28 s	28 s
Total Opening of Relief Valves (T <sub>ric</sub> > 330 C)	2209 s	2259 s
Main Coolant Pumps trip (∆T <sub>sat</sub> < 10 C)	2214 s	2266 s
Accum injection (start of first accum discharge)	3524 s	3603 s
Accum isolation (accum off)	6189 s	7184 s
Start of relocation to Lower Plenum (first corium slump)	7487 s	8700 s
Vessel failure (Lower Head Vessel failure)	18254 s	18474 s

#### **TOTAL OPENING OF THE RELIEF VALVES**



# **Accumulators isolation**



Accum isolation when  $P_{prim} < 15$  bar (1.5 MPa)

#### HYDROGEN PRODUCED DURING THE IN-VESSEL PHASE



(\*) time intervals to be better investigated using latest ASTEC and MELCOR versions

#### **CONCLUSIONS (1)**



ASTEC AND MELCOR are able to calculate a whole LFW-SG (H2) sequence for a French PWR 900 MWe.

A new comparison made using MELCOR 1.8.6 and the latest version of ASTEC evidenced a general tendency of results to become closer for both codes, but...

EVEN IF THERE IS A FAIRLY GOOD CONSISTENCY BETWEEN ASTEC AND MELCOR, MAINLY IN THE "FRONT - END" PART OF THE LFW-SG SEQUENCE (PRIMARY SYSTEM BEHAVIOUR, CORE HEAT-UP PHASE UNTIL STRONG OXIDATION), IN THE SECOND PART OF THE ACCIDENT EVOLUTION, WHEN SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL RELOCATION OCCURS, SOME DISCREPANCIES STILL APPEAR.

# **CONCLUSIONS (2)**



# IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE A COMPARISON WORK TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE SOURCE TERM.

